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Abstract 
Purpose – A predicted increase in climate change-related extreme weather events 
will present hospitals with new health-related and physical risks which were not 
originally anticipated in building and infrastructure designs. Markus et al.’s building 
systems model is used to analyse a range of adaptive strategies to cope with such 
events. The paper aims to discuss these issues. 
Design/methodology/approach – Focus group interviews were conducted with a 
wide range of hospital stakeholders across three case study hospitals in Australia 
and New Zealand which have experienced extreme weather events. 
Findings – It is concluded that effective adaptive strategies must balance responses 
across different organisational sub-systems. Contrary to previous research, the 
findings indicate that hospital managers do see hospital infrastructure as an 
important component of disaster response. However, it is the least adaptable of all 
response subsystems, making other options more attractive in the heat of a crisis. 
Research limitations/implications – A focus on three case studies allowed the 
researchers to explore in-depth the experiences of stakeholders who had 
experienced extreme weather events. While producing highly valid results, the 
inherent limitation of this approach is the lack of breath. So further case studies are 
needed to generalise from the results. 
Practical implications – Recommendations are made to improve the adaptive 
capacity of healthcare facilities to cope with the future health challenges of climate 
change risk. 
Originality/value – By acknowledging that no one group holds all the knowledge to 
deal with extreme weather events, this paper capture the collective knowledge of all 
key stakeholders who have a stake in the process of responding effectively to such 
an event. It shows that hospital adaptation strategies cannot be considered in 
isolation from the surrounding emergency management systems in which a hospital 
is imbedded. 
Keywords – Hospitals, Risk, Climate change, Systems, Adaptive capacity, Extreme 
weather  
 
Introduction  
Extreme weather events are caused when an individual climate variable such as 
wind speed temperature or rainfall “exceeds a particular threshold and deviates 
significantly from mean climate conditions” (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010, p. 2). In 
recent years there has been accumulating evidence of an increased incidence of 
such events (such as temperature extremes, floods and storms) and one of the most 
concerning impacts is anticipated to be on human health (Hennessy, et al., 2007; 
Stern, 2009). For example, in Australia, heatwaves kill more people than any other 
natural disaster and are associated with increased incidence of Malaria and Dengue 
fever, respiratory diseases and heatstroke and exhaustion (McMichael and 
Woodruff, 2007, Luber & McGeehin 2008, PWC 2011). These health impacts affect 
the most vulnerable in our communities and are anticipated to increase into the 
future as populations age, grow and urbanise. 
 
Given the implications of extreme weather events for human health, it is widely 
acknowledged that there is a need to better understand how to protect and improve 
the resilience of public health systems to such events (DEWR 2007, PCI 2011). 
However, previous research in facilities management has argued that buildings have 
long been an undervalued resource in many sectors including health and that the 
facilities management profession is itself at risk (Valins and Salter 1996, McGregor 
and Then 1999, Georgoulis 2008). Yet while new hospitals are relatively resilient to 
external forces, existing building stock is less resilient and there is a particular need 
to develop new adaptation strategies to address any new risks posed (DEWR, 
2007). For example, recent extreme weather events have illustrated that many 
hospitals are built on floodplains, that floods can exert pressure on structures that 
can cause them to collapse and that water infiltration can damage equipment and 
services (often located in basements which are prone to flooding). Moving flood 
water is also a major problem during extreme weather and can undermine roads and 
foundations (FEMA 2010, 2012b, Helman et al. 2010). And the high winds which 
normally accompany storms can strip roof and wall coverings and even blow whole 
structures down. Equipment on the roof is especially vulnerable to wind and once 
loosened, flying debris may cause further danger to people and damage property 
(Mason & Haynes 2010; Verdon-Kidd et al. 2010). In contrast, during heatwaves 
extreme temperatures can exceed the temperature tolerances of many existing 
construction materials, designs and heat management technologies causing them to 
break down and under-perform. Many patients’ health depends on precisely 
controlled temperature and humidity conditions, meaning this can be a serious risk. 
And finally, hospital dependency on critical infrastructure such as electricity, gas and 
water has been found to be a major risk during extreme weather events since they 
are also likely to suffer serious outages (Hiete et al. 2011; AIHA 2010; Hampton 
2011; WHO 2009b).   
Within this context the aim of this paper is to discuss the types of adaptive strategies 
that can be put in place to deal with these new risks.  
Adaptive strategies to cope with extreme weather events 
Given growing international concern about the resilience of health facilities in the 
face of climate change, many countries have strengthened and developed legal 
frameworks, research and funding schemes for disaster reduction and climate 
change adaptation. For example, the Pan-American Health Organisation has 
published extensively on the structural integrity of hospitals, with special attention to 
high winds and earthquakes, including guides on how to construct, maintain and 
retrofit hospitals (PAHO 2008; WHO 2010). The United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and the Hyogo Framework for Action are 
also addressing the broader task of global disaster reduction, which includes the 
safety and continual operability of health services (ISDR  2008; Shaw et al. 2010). 
Outside the UN, individual countries are also producing their own research and 
guidance. For example, in Australia, BRANZ produced a climate change adaptation 
report for the Australian Greenhouse Office (BRANZ 2007), which addressed climate 
change impacts on buildings and adaptation options. The National Climate Change 
Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) has produced several extreme weather 
case studies (Kiern et al. 2010), which take various approaches, and the Australian 
Building Codes Board has produced two recent drafts on flood mitigation (ABCB 
2011). In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Building Science 
Branch develops and produces multi-hazard mitigation publications that aim to 
create disaster-resilient communities and reduce loss of life and property. These 
publications mainly focus on floods, high winds and earthquakes. FEMA’s design 
guide for improving hospital safety provides important insights into multi-hazard 
mitigation for health facilities (FEMA 2007b) and is complemented by their design 
guide for improving critical facility safety (FEMA 2007a). In the UK the FloodProBE 
project aims to provide cost-effective solutions for flood risk reduction in urban areas. 
FloodProBE develop and test adaptation technologies and research ways of 
integrating flood protection into urban planning (van Ree et al. 2011). A review of the 
literature in this area (which includes the above) indicates the following strategies are 
widely recommended for different types of extreme weather events. 
 
Flooding: 
 
• Elevation - raise building above expected flood levels. 
• Floodwalls and levees – to deny flood waters entry to an area. 
• Dry flood proofing – to prevent water intrusion. 
• Wet flood proofing -  allows water to enter buildings in a controlled way. 
 
Storms: 
 
• Building design – Use smooth, regular and rounded shapes and materials. 
Avoid exterior-mounted equipment. Use a vestibule. 
• Urban design - Adjacent buildings can produce a wind tunnel effect and tall 
trees may fall and damage buildings and harm people. 
 
• Materials and specifications – Avoid unfixed materials, protect fragile 
materials like glass or use impact resistant materials particularly at lower 
levels. Use in-situ concrete structures and weather stripping. 
 
Heatwaves: 
• Air-conditioning -  Use HVAC systems keep internal environments at a 
constant temperature.  
• Natural Ventilation – HVAC systems are vulnerable to electrical outages. 
Hence, incorporate advanced natural ventilation combined with good passive 
design with sensor controlled mechanical apertures and fans.  
• Thermal insulation - Thermal insulation to keep indoor temperature constant 
with minimal heating and cooling.  
• Shading - External shading can be provided by orientation, vegetation, other 
buildings and external panels. Also use shutters, curtains, blinds, window 
tinting and solar reflective coatings and chromogenic technology. 
 
Having listed some of the common adaptive strategies recommended in the literature 
to manage the risks associated with extreme weather events, it is important to point 
out that multi-hazard mitigation is considered best practice. While it can be very 
costly to protect a building from one particular hazard, it is far more cost-effective to 
protect a building from multiple types of hazards (FEMA 2007b). Research has 
shown that different mitigation measures may reinforce or counter each other and 
FEMA provides a multi-hazard design matrix, which illustrates this. For example, 
shatter-proof thermochromic windows can withstand earthquakes and flying debris, 
and can also improve the thermal adaptive capacity of the building. Similarly, seals 
on doors can withstand both floodwaters and wind pressure. But the ultimate multi-
hazard mitigation strategy is the concept of building autonomy which is a completely 
self-sustained hospital capable of providing all the services that are needed in the 
building, including electricity, heating, cooling, ventilation, water collection, 
conservation and treatment, sewage and waste treatment, recycling, and food 
production. However, while completely self-sustained buildings are possible, they are 
virtually non-existent, due to the high cost of implementing such designs. This is 
particularly the case for hospitals as they rely on more services than most building 
types (Achour & Price 2010). It is therefore very difficult to make a hospital 
completely self-sustained. However, it is possible to ensure that a hospital can keep 
functioning at least for a few days by incorporating more built-in redundancies. 
 
Method 
To investigate the types of adaptive strategies which may be suitable in practice and 
their relative impacts on extreme weather event risks, our research employed a 
multiple case study approach.  This is important in the context of this research 
because understanding the operation of hospitals requires more than a simple 
appreciation of building related issues. As Becker and Carthey (2007) point out, a 
hospital is a complex organisation with many diverse stakeholders and functions 
which need to interact in the delivery of appropriate health services to a community. 
Responses to extreme weather events are similarly complex and given their scale 
are likely to require many parts of these systems working together. They are also 
likely to involve an interplay of many economic, social, organisational, political and 
cultural forces which can only be explored fully using a case study approach.  Other 
approaches to data collection, such as a large survey/questionnaire of people who 
have been involved in responding to such events would have failed to provide the 
depth of insight we needed to fully understand the social and organisational issues in 
this complex adaptive system.   
The case studies are described below and were selected based on their size and 
age, population dependency, historical climatic records and future climatic 
predictions. Each of these facilities had also been subjected to a severe weather 
event, namely flash floods; floods caused by storm surges and; heatwaves 
respectively.  
Coffs Harbour Base Hospital 
Situated on the mid North Coast of NSW, Coffs Harbour Base Hospital serves a 
population of 100,000. Coffs Harbour is a humid, sub-tropical area which means that 
flooding and storms are relatively common. While Coffs Harbour Base Hospital is 
relatively new, being operational only since 2001, the hospital suffers from its 
location adjacent to a creek and on a flood plain, and is one of the first areas in town 
to be inundated in a flooding event. Flood events have increased in frequency and 
intensity in recent years, with the region experiencing six major flooding events in 
2009 alone. 
Whangarei Hospital 
Whangarei serves a district of 78,000 and is located in the North Island of New 
Zealand. The hospital is situated on a hill, and accessed by only one road which can 
be cut off during floods and storms. A major renovation was undertaken in 2001, but 
many of the buildings date from the 1950s-1960s. The NZ Ministry for the 
Environment warns that due to climate change, Northland's temperature is expected 
to raise by 3oC over the next century and the frequency of floods could increase 
fourfold by 2090 (Ministry for the Environment 2009).  
Ceduna District Health Services 
Ceduna is located in the remote northwest corner of the Eyre Peninsula, South 
Australia and is approximately 10 hours by road from Adelaide. Out of its small 
population of 3,731, 25.5% of the population in 2006 identified themselves as 
indigenous i.e. of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander origin. Located within an arid 
zone, the town is exposed to hot, dry summers with limited rainfall, during which time 
the daytime temperatures can reach up to 47oC for a week or longer. In early 2009, 
when Adelaide reported up to 6 days over 40oC, Ceduna recorded a temperature of 
46.2oC. Ceduna District Health Services offers a mix of 25 acute care beds and 10 
beds for high level aged care, with a further 29 beds for low level aged care located 
on another site. 
Data collection 
Data collection was by means of a series of focus group sessions using a proprietary 
Risk and Opportunities Management System called ROMS (ROMS 2011). ROMS 
uses multimedia technology to provide a structured approach to help health sector 
stakeholders from varied backgrounds identify, assess and control the risks and 
opportunities associated with a nominated problem. In this case the problem posed 
was how to respond effectively to an extreme weather event scenario provided by 
our research team. Scenarios are a widely used method for helping stakeholders to 
think about risks and opportunities and in our cases the scenarios were generated 
from scientific advice and statistical evidence from the UNSW Climate Change 
Research Centre (a partner in this research). Given the different location of each 
case study hospital, three different scenarios were used which were relevant to each 
case study hospital's unique context. Namely, a flood scenario was posed for Coffs 
Harbour Hospital, a heatwave for Ceduna Hospital and a storm and flood for 
Whangarei Hospital.  
By acknowledging that no one group holds all the knowledge to deal with extreme 
weather events, ROMS provides an interactive, inclusive and constructive process 
which is able to harness and capture the collective knowledge of all key stakeholders 
who have a stake in the process of responding effectively to such an event 
(Loosemore, 2010). ROMS uses focus groups as the mechanism to collect this 
information since they are widely recognised as an effective way to promote 
interaction and self-disclosure among a carefully structured group of respondents 
who can share their perspectives about a specific topic in a non-judgemental 
environment (Morgan 1997).  
ROMS focus groups were run in two stages in each case study hospital with key 
stakeholders. Our focus group samples included: clinicians, emergency department 
staff, facility managers, nurses, technical staff, health care specialists and health 
service representatives. Stage one focus groups involved a one-day workshop to 
agree collective objectives in responding to an extreme weather event (ie. what 
resilience means for the stakeholders) and to identify and assess the risks and 
opportunities against these objectives. Stage two focus groups involved another one-
day workshop with the same stakeholders to consider the controls which could 
reduce these risks to an acceptable level and maximise the opportunities which had 
been identified in the stage one focus groups.  
Discussion of results 
Although each case study faced a different scenario, we have sought here to present 
our results as one combined analysis in line with the efficient multi-hazard 
philosophy described above. To this end, the common organisational objectives 
across all case studies which emerged were, in order of priority:  
1. Continuity of service delivery  
2. Preserving the building structure’s integrity along with its building services 
3. Having effective communication both externally and internally 
4. Maintaining access to and from the site  
5. Ensuring availability and safety of relevant staff on hand to respond to the 
crises. 
Across the three case studies a total of 90 risks were identified, assessed and 
ranked and 158 adaptive strategies were identified which if implemented, would 
reduce the risk profile to acceptable levels for our focus group stakeholders. These 
risks and controls were then represented as Rich Picture Diagram (RPD) to show the 
health sub system interdependencies which determine the health system's entire 
response to an extreme weather event (McGeorge et. al 2011) (see Figure 1). The 
advantage of RPD is that it overcomes the inherent limitations of traditional linear 
risk analysis methodologies which ignore subsystem interdependencies and wrongly 
assume that risks arise linearly and in isolation and that there is always some root 
cause to be searched for (Forrester 1994). In simple terms, a RPD is a pictorial 
multi-layered representation of the real world using symbols to represent sub-
systems and their relationships (of different types – communications, dependencies 
etc) within a defined system boundary (Patching 1990). The number of arrows 
surrounding a particular node (risk) on the RPD gives some measure of the overall 
level it poses to the system as a whole.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Rich Picture diagram of case study 1 
In selecting additional controls to mitigate risk and maximise opportunity in a 
commercial setting, it is normal in risk management practice to select them on the 
basis of a cost/benefit comparison. The control which yields the greatest 
improvement (risk reduction) for the least cost will normally be chosen. However, in 
the context of health facilities, our stakeholders had a number of other 
considerations to make in addition to monetary costs. These included existing 
government policies (which are continually changing in the realm of healthcare), their 
own power within the organisation (health care is extremely hierarchical and 
political), and the unpredictability and severity of extreme weather events (we can 
only predict extreme weather events with a low level of granularity).  These 
additional considerations added to the complexity of selecting appropriate controls. It 
also showed that their implementation would require the resilience of the whole 
system and thus necessitate hospital emergency managers to undertake a wide 
range of actions, from lobbying governments to moving equipment to different parts 
of the building to maximise its function or prevent damage etc. Furthermore, while 
our research was focussed on hospital infrastructure, it became evident that it is not 
possible to isolate this from the wider health system in which it is imbedded and that 
only some of the controls were building related. Potential controls often act together 
to have an effect which is greater than the sum of the parts, or conversely be 
cancelled out by a competing parameter or control in the wider health system. 
Finally, not all controls are completely within the influence of the health organisation 
in question (ie. lobbying the state government a good example).  
In order to better understand the nature of possible controls a coding exercise was 
undertaken to categorise possible strategies to compare like-with-like and to identify 
any patterns that could be used towards formulating an adaptive strategy. Patterns 
were identified by examining co-occurrences such as correlation between “code 
items, themes, respondents or events” (Guest & McLennan, 2003, p. 188). And each 
item coded was checked against the others to establish analytical categories, in a 
process referred to as ‘constant comparison’ (Pope et al 2000). 
This analysis was, in essence, an exploration of “spheres of influence” (Pettigrew 
and McNulty 1995).  To this end, the identified controls were separated into 
endogenous  and exogenous categories and were then further broken down into 
‘within sphere of influence’, ‘partially within sphere of influence’ and ‘outside sphere 
of influence’. The term ‘endogenous’ refers to the sphere of influence of decision 
takers in the case study hospitals. The term ‘exogenous’ refers to the sphere of 
influence of external agencies, such as other government departments or private 
organisations. These categories reflect the nature of the healthcare systems which 
are characterised by a complex hierarchical structure of decision takers and 
governance regimes with varying spheres of influence.  
 
 It was clear from our second workshop that the likelihood of a control being 
proposed and, in turn, implemented is directly correlated to the degree of influence 
or authority which a stakeholder is able to exert over other actors in the health 
system. For example, in the case of Ceduna hospital, when faced with the challenge 
of needing to accommodate staff on site during a heatwave event, ideas of appealing 
to a higher authority for funding quickly turned inwards, with participants noting “I 
think we can do some of that ourselves... we could publically raise funds [from the 
local community] for couches and the like”. Examples of endogenous and exogenous 
controls are provided in Table 1 although in practice the boundary between them is 
fuzzy.   
Table 1 – Endogenous and exogenous controls 
 Categories Definition Example (extracted 
from ROMS workshop 
transcripts) 
En
do
ge
no
us
 (N
) 
Within sphere 
of influence 
(W) 
Actions that can easily be 
implemented using existing 
resources and associations within 
the hospital organisation 
Set up a pseudo 
pharmacy service for 
visitors 
Partially within 
sphere of 
influence (P) 
Actions that will require 
collaboration or assistance from 
other health departments 
Develop support system 
amongst local hospitals 
Outside 
sphere of 
Strategic decisions relating to the 
hospital that its organisation does 
Build a new hospital 
influence (O) not have the authority to make 
Ex
og
en
ou
s 
(X
) 
Within sphere 
of influence 
(W) 
Actions involving or dealing with 
outside bodies but which the 
hospital organisation can easily 
manage and control 
Educate public about 
extreme weather event 
risks 
Partially within 
sphere of 
influence (P) 
Actions involving or dealing with 
outside bodies but which the 
hospital organisation can manage 
and control somewhat 
Negotiate with nearby 
mining company to 
share their helicopter 
services for flying 
patients in and out 
Outside 
sphere of 
influence (O) 
Actions involving or dealing with 
outside bodies and which the 
hospital organisation has little 
scope or likelihood of management 
and control 
Lobby commonwealth 
government to change 
the building 
requirements for aged 
care facilities 
 
 
When analysing our respondents’ controls we also noted that many were not only 
related to the physical building but to other activities that occurred within it. To 
understand this further we used a model produced by Markus et al (1972) to analysis 
our results. Despite being forty years old, Markus’ model is still as relevant and as 
useful today to show how the building sub system relates to other sub systems in an 
organisation. According to Markus et al, a building facility and its stakeholders can 
be seen as an ‘adaptive system’ which comprises five key elements (sub-systems): 
the building system; the environmental system; the activity system; the objectives 
system and the resources system. The Building System comprises the external 
envelope; the structure; the division of internal spaces, services and contents. The 
Environmental System refers to the internal building environment created by the 
building system. The Activity System represents what happens within the facility and 
the Resources System represents the external environment from which the other sub 
systems draw to enable them to function effectively. This includes the supply of 
physical, financial and human resources. In simple terms, the building system 
creates the environmental system which people inhabit and use to perform activities 
in order to achieve defined organisational objectives.  
Combining Markus et al’s ideas with the concept of endogenous and exogenous 
controls, Table 2 shows an example of the typical types of activities that were 
classified into each category.  
  Sub-systems 
  Building Environment Activity Objectives 
En
do
ge
no
u
s 
(E
n)
 
W Program to 
replace 
defective steel 
windows to 
aluminium ones 
Set up a 
pseudo 
pharmacy/food 
etc service for 
visitors 
Improve internal 
communication
s relating to 
early warning - 
give staff time 
to move cars, 
Develop a 
policy to call in 
staff when early 
warning 
received 
etc 
P Avoid flat roof 
when next 
replacing it 
(during an 
extension 
perhaps) 
Temporarily 
move ED up to 
day procedures 
unit 
Develop 
telehealth links 
to tertiary 
centres 
Provide policy 
to support other 
hospitals 
O Build a new 
hospital 
Lobby Council 
to address 
maintenance of 
road as a top 
priority 
(none recorded) (none recorded) 
Ex
og
en
ou
s 
(E
x)
 
W Look at other 
accommodation 
near hospital 
site to house 
additional 
patients/visitors 
- hotel is 
community 
owned so 
negotiation is 
easy 
Use alternative 
sites such as 
local school 
ground to land 
helicopter in 
event of high 
wind 
Set up 
automated early 
warning system 
 
Develop a 
community 
welfare/disaster 
plan to consider 
issues such as 
accommodation
, food etc. 
P Talk to power 
company about 
using hospital 
as a test bed for 
solar generation 
Liaise with 
other Council 
agencies to use 
their fleet during 
an event 
Negotiate with 
private 
developer to 
build car park 
Work together 
with Council 
and SES to 
develop 
mitigation 
strategy 
O Lobby RTA 
(Road & Traffic 
Authority) to 
upgrade road 
Lobby council 
to fix their 
services  
Help aged-care 
facilities secure 
funding to 
develop risk 
management 
controls  
Lobby 
government to 
make risk 
management 
part of aged 
care facility 
accreditation 
process 
 
Table 2 Examples of adaptive controls in each coding category 
 
Table 3 shows the results of categorising all 158 adaptive controls identified by our 
respondents using this coding framework. 
 Buildin
 
Environme
 
Activity Objective
 
Totals 
 Table 3 Adaptive controls by sphere of influence 
Table 3 shows that adaptive controls in dealing with the risks of extreme weather 
events in hospitals are quite evenly spread across the building (41), environmental 
(30), activity (47) and objectives (40) systems. This indicates that any response to an 
extreme weather event must be a balanced one across these different sub systems. 
Given that stakeholders in the ROMS focus groups were evenly balanced across all 
functional groups in the hospital system, this would also seem to contradict the 
literature in facilities management which claims that the relationship between health 
service outcomes and hospital performance is neglected in the health sector and that 
infrastructure is an under-appreciated and under-utilised resource (McGregor and 
Then 1999, Valins and Salter 1996).  If this were the case then one would have 
expected to have seen the controls focussed into the three other “non building” 
categories. Furthermore, Table 3 shows that most of the controls were endogenous 
(109) rather than exogenous (49). That is, they were generally independent of 
external stakeholders’ cooperation. Nevertheless, it is also clear that wider 
exogenous governance structures and factors at state and federal levels have an 
important bearing on a hospital’s ability to respond to an extreme weather event.  
It is also interesting from Table 3 that most of the adaptive responses to extreme 
weather events are within the sphere of influence (W = 109) of the stakeholders in 
our focus groups and that the building system has the highest proportion of 
endogenous controls (30), followed by the objectives (29), activity (28) and 
environmental (22) systems. This suggests that the building itself is a source of 
adaptive capacity which can be changed without recourse to external (and therefore 
relatively uncontrollable) powers. However, when one looks at the relative W, P and 
O totals for each sub system, then the building system has the greatest O score 
(5+4=9) compared to the environmental system (1+3=4), Activity system (0+1=1) 
and Objectives system (0+5=5). As a proportion of total controls (9/44 = 20.45%) this 
represents the highest proportion of O scores of any sub system (environment 4/22 = 
18.18%; Activity 1/28 = 3.57%; Objectives 5/29 = 17.24%). This indicates that while 
the building system is an important source of adaptive strategies to cope with 
extreme weather events, the controls associated with the building system were, 
relatively speaking, outside the sphere of influence of our stakeholder group. 
Managers might therefore be tempted to look first at changing the activity and 
objectives system since these contained by far the largest proportion of controllable 
strategies – thereby enabling a faster response to an extreme weather event 
W P O All 
En 30 22 28 29    109 
W 20 18 25 25 88    
P 5 3 3 4  15   
O 5 1 0 0   6  
Ex 11 8 19 11    49 
W 2 2 13 4 21    
P 5 3 5 2  15   
O 4 3 1 5   13  
TOTA
L 
41 30 47 40 109 30 19 158 
scenario. This may help explain why previous research has shown that hospital 
buildings are undervalued in healthcare management. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to explore the range of controls that hospital organisations 
can put in place to mitigate the risk of extreme weather events. Our findings indicate 
that hospital buildings and the facility managers that manage them are an important 
part of a much larger open system which must work in an integrated way if any 
response is to be effective. Given that one part of the system cannot be considered 
in isolation this raises important governance issues for facility managers which 
should be explored in future research. Our findings also show that it is important for 
hospital facility managers to work cooperatively with other external authorities such 
as public infrastructure, aged care, and government organisations in developing 
effective responses.  
There are clearly a wide range of adaptive strategies which can be used to respond 
to an extreme weather event that span across hospital building, environment, activity 
and objectives systems. However, it is also clear that while some building system 
strategies are within the control of healthcare organisations (without recourse to 
external agencies) they are often among the least controllable strategies that can be 
enacted. The building sub system may be relatively uncontrollable compared to other 
sub systems in hospitals because once constructed, building elements are takes a 
relatively long time to change. Our research suggests that it may be related to the 
inflexibility of hospital designs and the dispersed internal governance structures that 
control these resources. Our research also supports Haigh and Amaratunga’s (2010) 
view that more focus needs to be given to the built environment in the context of 
disaster prevention and management. 
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